Finding Viewpoint Neutrality in Our Constitutional Constellation by Douglas, Maura
	
727 
COMMENTS 
FINDING VIEWPOINT NEUTRALITY IN OUR  
CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTELLATION 
Maura Douglas* 
INTRODUCTION 
Viewpoint-based regulations have long been regarded as the most 
contemptuous, democracy-threatening restrictions on speech: “censorship in 
its purest form”1 that attempts to suppress disfavored or supposedly 
dangerous ideas.2  Indeed, the promotion of diverse thought and the 
constitutionally protected right to speak freely separates the United States 
from totalitarian regimes.3  Justice Jackson stated in an oft-quoted passage in 
West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette4: “If there is any fixed star in our 
constitutional constellation, it is that no official . . . can prescribe what shall 
be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or 
force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein.”5  Yet as the Court 
has retracted6 and expanded its recognition of maintaining so-called 
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 1 Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 62 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 2 See Marjorie Heins, Viewpoint Discrimination, 24 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 99, 102–04 (1996) 
(“[G]overnment discrimination against broad categories of expression such as ‘political,’ 
‘controversial,’ or ‘offensive’ speech, is often a guise for disagreement with the ideas expressed, or 
is so close in spirit to viewpoint discrimination . . . .”). 
 3 See Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949) (“The right to speak freely and to promote 
diversity of ideas and programs is therefore one of the chief distinctions that sets us apart from 
totalitarian regimes.”). 
 4 319 U.S. 624 (1943); see also id. at 644 (Black & Douglas, JJ., concurring) (“These laws must, to be 
consistent with the First Amendment, permit the widest toleration of conflicting viewpoints 
consistent with a society of free men.”). 
 5 Id. at 642. 
 6 The viewpoint neutrality principle was curtailed temporarily during McCarthyism.  See Nicole B. 
Cásarez, Public Forums, Selective Subsidies, and Shifting Standards of Viewpoint Discrimination, 64 ALB. L. 
REV. 501, 508 (2000) (discussing how the Court in the 1950s merely paid “lip service” to the idea 
that contrarian views had a right to be expressed). 
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viewpoint neutrality at all costs, it has simultaneously left open opportunities 
for viewpoint discrimination to be permissible, without necessarily providing 
for a logical roadmap to analyze it in every context. 
The Court has not provided consistency in its determinations of 
viewpoint neutrality (or conversely, viewpoint discrimination) in state action.  
Given that viewpoint-based regulations are an “egregious form” of content 
discrimination, the Court applies some version of strict scrutiny. But, even 
that determination seems to stand on shaky ground because such scrutiny is 
rarely applied to viewpoint-based regulations.  Instead, the Court may 
determine that viewpoint discrimination exists, state that strict scrutiny 
applies, and—without conducting further analysis—find the state action 
unconstitutional.  It has become a sort of prophetic realization before the 
prophecy is actually realized.7  Then-professor Elena Kagan noted in 1996 
that the Court “almost always rigorously reviews [to find if viewpoint 
discrimination exists] and then invalidates regulations based on viewpoint” 
rather than explicitly apply strict scrutiny as it would to other content-based 
restrictions.8  Other legal scholars have even argued that “[t]here can be no 
exceptions to the constitutional bar of viewpoint-based regulations.”9  The 
Court itself has stated that determining a law is content-based and viewpoint-
discriminatory is “all but dispositive.”10  However, most federal courts still 
recognize that there is “impermissible viewpoint discrimination,” which 
implies there are certain viewpoint-based regulations on speech that are 
permissible.11  And emphatic statements such as “the absolute First 
Amendment heavy presumption against viewpoint discrimination”12 are 
oxymoronic in their resoluteness: how can a presumption be absolute? 
If viewpoint discrimination is fundamentally unconstitutional, then there 
need be no further scrutiny of a viewpoint-based regulation, because it would 
per se be impermissible.  If, on the other hand, viewpoint-based restrictions 
are not per se unconstitutional, and are subject to strict scrutiny, then there 
would be no need for the Court to functionally distinguish between content-
based and viewpoint-based regulations.  Now, this is an oversimplification of 
	
 7 See WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, MACBETH act 4, sc. 1 (prophesying how Macbeth would die when 
“Great Birnam wood to high Dunsinane Hill Shall come against him;” he resigned himself to such 
fate when he realized it was happening). 
 8 Elena Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of Governmental Motive in First Amendment Doctrine, 
63 U. CHI. L. REV. 413, 444 (1996). 
 9 Martin H. Redish, Commercial Speech, First Amendment Intuitionism and the Twilight Zone of Viewpoint 
Discrimination, 41 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 67, 109 (2007) (emphasis added); see also RODNEY A. SMOLLA, 
1 SMOLLA & NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 4:8 (2017) (citing late twentieth-century federal 
court case law to find that “[m]odern First Amendment cases establish a per se rule making the 
punishment of speech flatly unconstitutional if the penalty is based on the offensiveness or the 
undesirability of the viewpoint expressed.”). 
 10 Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 571 (2011) (citation omitted). 
 11 See infra Subpart II.B. 
 12 SMOLLA, supra note 9, § 11:26. 
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the tension, and is flawed when a First Amendment analysis is complicated 
by such considerations as the type of forum and speech to which the 
regulation applies.13  And this is murky terrain even for just content 
discrimination, since some members of the Court feel strict scrutiny should 
not automatically apply to all content-based regulations.14  It is likely, then, 
that the implicit legal analysis of viewpoint-discrimination claims falls 
somewhere in the middle: the strict scrutiny applied to viewpoint-based 
regulations is more strict (practically fatal) than other types of content 
discrimination, but no absolute bar exists, perhaps in part to provide 
breathing room for future decisions. 
This Comment considers this puzzle in more detail by examining both 
recent decisions of the Supreme Court as well as those of the federal courts 
of appeals that wrestle with these questions: whether a statute is viewpoint-
neutral, and when, if ever, a federal court will uphold a restriction whilst 
simultaneously determining it is viewpoint-based.  Part I provides a broad 
legal definition of viewpoint neutrality, as distinguished from content 
neutrality.  Part II begins an account of when the Court has invalidated 
viewpoint-based regulations, as well as the circumstances in which it has 
upheld them.15  Part III reviews decisions made by the federal courts of 
appeals from 2014 to 2017 involving viewpoint-discrimination challenges to 
state action.  Specifically, Subpart III.A addresses the impact of shifting 
outside of the forum analysis, focusing in greater detail on the impact of 
Walker v. Texas Division, Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc.16  Subpart III.B looks 
at how heightened discretion in limited public forums and nonpublic forums 
may lead to premature findings of viewpoint neutrality, and how this could 
lead to increased viewpoint discrimination.  Finally, Part IV addresses the 
most recent Supreme Court determination of viewpoint discrimination in 
Matal v. Tam,17 and its implications for how federal courts may analyze 
impermissible viewpoint discrimination claims in the future. 
	
 13 See infra Part II.  Laws can be constitutionally content-based but viewpoint-neutral in a limited 
public forum or nonpublic forum under intermediate scrutiny, or in a public forum under strict 
scrutiny. 
 14 See, e.g., Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2234 (2015) (Breyer, J., concurring) (“In my 
view, the category ‘content discrimination’ is better considered in many contexts, including here, 
as a rule of thumb, rather than as an automatic ‘strict scrutiny’ trigger, leading to almost certain 
legal condemnation.”); id. at 2238 (Kagan, J., concurring) (noting that if a statute does not 
realistically suppress certain ideas, then “we may do well to relax our guard so that ‘entirely 
reasonable’ laws imperiled by strict scrutiny can survive.”). 
 15 This is meant to provide a general overview and identify broad trends in these categories involving 
the pursuit of identifying and analyzing viewpoint neutrality.  This is by no means an all-
encompassing survey of the case law and secondary research already completed on this topic.  It is 
intended to set the backdrop for recent circuit decisions. 
 16 135 S. Ct. 2239 (2015). 
 17 137 S. Ct. 1744 (2017). 
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I.  BASIC CONTOURS OF VIEWPOINT NEUTRALITY 
According to well-settled First Amendment principle, the Constitution 
does not authorize the “official suppression of ideas.”18  A viewpoint-based 
restriction does just that; namely, it aims to suppress a particular view that 
may be considered dangerous (to the government).19  More specifically, the 
Court defines viewpoint discrimination as a regulation of speech, the rationale 
for which is the “specific motivating ideology or the opinion or perspective of 
the speaker.”20  Justice Brennan referred to viewpoint discrimination as pure 
censorship and a fierce threat to the “continued vitality” of freedom of 
expression.21  Because of its association with muzzling speech due to the 
particular idea expressed, inapposite to the First Amendment, viewpoint 
discrimination is presumed impermissible in almost every context. 
Given its key role in free speech doctrine as a means to effectively 
facilitate the free marketplace of ideas, viewpoint neutrality can “preserve the 
reality of free expression” in a society diverse with beliefs, thoughts, and 
experiences.22  Of course, this core principle of American legal jurisprudence 
cuts against the concurrent reality that free expression leaves the public space 
open for “thought that we hate.”23  In Cohen v. California, Justice Harlan struck 
down a law criminalizing offensive conduct that was “maliciously and 
willfully disturb[ing] the peace” as applied to wearing a jacket that said “Fuck 
the Draft.”24  Harlan emphasized that speech did not need to meet social 
standards of acceptability, so long as communicated peacefully, and that 
“[t]he constitutional right of free expression is powerful medicine in a society 
	
 18 Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2237 (citation omitted); see also N.Y. Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 725 
(1971) (Brennan, J., concurring) (“[T]he First Amendment stands as an absolute bar to the 
imposition of judicial restraints [to block the publication of material sought to be suppressed by the 
Government] . . . .”).  See generally United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 (1990); Cohen v. 
California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971); Burstyn v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952). 
 19 See Am. Commc’ns Ass’n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 402 (1950) (“Under some circumstances, indirect 
‘discouragements’ undoubtedly have the same coercive effect upon the exercise of First Amendment 
rights as imprisonment, fines, injunctions or taxes.”); see also Heins, supra note 2, at 106–10. 
 20 Rosenberger v. Rector of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995) (citation omitted). 
 21 Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 62 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 22 Seth F. Kreimer, Good Enough for Government Work: Two Cheers for Content Neutrality, 16 U. PA. J. CONST. 
L. 1261, 1276 (2014) (“The core question for first amendment doctrine should be neither whether 
every application preserves the essence of democratic discourse . . . nor whether all ‘common sense’ 
or ‘proportionate’ regulations survive its strictures.  Rather, attention should focus on the extent to 
which the doctrine contributes to a system of norms which preserve the reality of free expression in 
American society.”).  Professor Redish argues viewpoint discrimination is “the most universally 
condemned threat to the foundations of free expression.”  Redish, supra note 9, at 69. 
 23 Kreimer, supra note 22, at 1330 n.173 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 
 24 Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 16 (1971).  The Court specifically distinguished the expression 
used by Cohen from other cases involving fighting words because the speech was not directed at 
anyone.  Accord Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 258–59 (1951) (upholding a state statute that 
criminalized the exhibit of any play or sketch portraying a class of citizens in a significantly negative 
light, reasoning that the state should have power to punish libel “directed at a defined group”). 
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as diverse and populous as [this].”25  While the Court never used the phrase 
“viewpoint neutrality,” the thrust of its importance is evident in Cohen and in 
earlier precedent.26  It “is the function of speech to free men from the 
bondage of irrational fears,”27 and state-sanctioned suppression of differences 
in viewpoints can lead to suspicion, willful ignorance, and even hatred. 
A.  Distinguishing Content-Based and Viewpoint-Based Regulations 
Viewpoint discrimination is a form of content discrimination, and the 
Court in recent years frequently has used “content” and “viewpoint” 
interchangeably.28  But despite this conflation, the terms encompass distinct 
meanings.  Content discrimination exists if the government restricts 
discussion of an entire topic; content and viewpoint discrimination exist if the 
government restricts specific points of view on that topic.  Further, an 
otherwise viewpoint-neutral, content-based regulation may still be 
viewpoint-discriminatory if applied in a manner that discriminates against a 
particular view.  Elena Kagan illustrated this “hazier” distinction within 
content-based regulations with the following example: 
[T]he Court would treat differently a law prohibiting the use of billboards 
for all political advertisements and a law prohibiting the use of billboards for 
political advertisements supporting Democrats.  The former might meet 
constitutional standards; the latter would never succeed in doing so.  It is not 
so much that the Court formally uses two different standards for subject 
matter and viewpoint regulation; in most contexts, a strict scrutiny standard 
applies to content-based action of all kinds.  But the Court, when reviewing 
subject-matter restrictions, either may apply a purportedly strict standard 
less than strictly or may disdain to recognize the law as content based at all.29 
Kagan’s example identifies the distinction between “viewpoint” and 
“content”—albeit with a stark example not before the Court—and 
underscores interpretive challenges of applying this doctrine, triggering the 
same level of scrutiny for different types of regulations (or different standards 
of scrutiny to the same type of regulation).30  Ultimately, all content-based 
	
 25 Cohen, 403 U.S. at 24. 
 26 See supra note 18 and accompanying text. 
 27 Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 376 (1927) (Brandeis & Holmes, JJ., concurring). 
 28 Justice Thomas pointed out this confusion in Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2229–30 (2015), 
faulting the Ninth Circuit with assuming the town code at issue was content-neutral because it did 
not discriminate based on viewpoint.  Justice Brennan also reasoned that the “content neutrality 
principle” grew out of the core prohibition against viewpoint discrimination.  Perry Educ. Ass’n v. 
Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 59 (1983). 
 29 Kagan, supra note 8, at 444.  Kagan’s use of “subject matter” rather than content may not survive 
following Thomas’ example in Reed.  While the Court in Reed invalidated a content-based, 
viewpoint-neutral regulation, there was not unanimous agreement that the regulation was not 
viewpoint-discriminatory.  Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2239 (Kagan, J., concurring). 
 30 For an example of how a lower court may struggle to either interpret the Supreme Court’s analysis 
or ignore it altogether, see infra Part III. 
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and viewpoint-based restrictions on speech are currently subject to strict 
scrutiny in public fora and presumptively invalid, except in a narrow set of 
cases discussed later in this Comment.31 
Reed v. Town of Gilbert provides a recent illustration of deciphering whether 
a content-based regulation is also viewpoint-based.32  In Reed, the Court 
unanimously found a town ordinance that differentiated between temporary 
messages and political or ideological messages on public signs facially 
unconstitutional, and an impermissible content-based regulation on 
speech.33  Justice Thomas, writing for the majority, noted that the sign code 
was content-based even though it did not discriminate against certain 
viewpoints.34  He used the following analogy, similar to that of Kagan, to 
distinguish the two kinds of regulations: 
[A] speech regulation targeted at specific subject matter is content 
based even if it does not discriminate among viewpoints . . . . For 
example, a law banning the use of sound trucks for political speech—
and only political speech—would be a content-based regulation, even 
if it imposed no limits on the political viewpoints that could be 
expressed.  The Town’s Sign Code likewise singles out specific subject 
matter for differential treatment, even if it does not target viewpoints 
within that subject matter.  Ideological messages are given more 
favorable treatment than [political] messages[,] . . . which are 
themselves given more favorable treatment than messages 
announcing an assembly of like-minded individuals.35 
Even though the statute was viewpoint-neutral, it was content-based, as 
Thomas points out, and could not survive strict scrutiny.36  A restriction on 
free speech can therefore be bucketed into three categories relevant to a 
viewpoint-neutrality inquiry: content-neutral, and thus viewpoint-neutral; 
content-based but viewpoint-neutral; and content-based and viewpoint-
based.37  However, Justices frequently disagree both about whether 
viewpoint discrimination exists, and also the extent to which it is permissible, 
which has provoked confusion and discord across the federal bench. 
	
 31 See infra Subpart II.B; see also United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2544 (2012) (listing the 
categories of speech where content-based restrictions have traditionally been permitted: advocacy 
intended to incite imminent lawless action, obscenity, defamation, speech integral to criminal 
conduct, fraud, fighting words, child pornography, true threats, and speech “presenting some grave 
and imminent threat the government has the power to prevent”). 
 32 Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2229–30. 
 33 Id. at 2232. 
 34 Id. at 2230–31. 
 35 Id. at 2230. 
 36 Id. at 2228–30. 
 37 EUGENE VOLOKH, THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND RELATED STATUTES 361 (5th ed. 2014). 
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B.  Content-Based, Viewpoint-Neutral Regulations 
Considering the Court’s analysis of content-based regulations illustrates 
in part why federal courts have struggled to apply First Amendment law 
uniformly when it comes to content-based regulations that implicate 
questions of viewpoint discrimination.38  This Subpart is intended to provide 
a broad sense of where the Court has situated itself in the past two decades 
on when a statute is viewpoint-neutral, but content-based, when it is not, and 
when such regulations can be constitutional.39  It may appear straightforward 
on its face to determine what is a “viewpoint” or “discrimination,” but the 
Court has been far from clear on that front, which raises concerns for lower 
courts as well as litigants and policymakers. 
Even if a content-based regulation on protected speech in a public or 
designated public forum is considered viewpoint-neutral, it is still subject to 
strict scrutiny.40  In a public forum, for example, the government cannot 
selectively restrict expression due to its ideas, message or content, but can 
enforce reasonable time, place or manner restrictions that are narrowly 
tailored to the stated interest, justified without reference to content.41  While 
individual expression cannot be restricted solely due to the views expressed, 
that right must be met by the reality that people cannot “publicize their views 
‘whenever and however and wherever they please.’”42 
Frequently, any analysis of viewpoint neutrality will be foregone if a 
challenged regulation would fail under a less demanding test, regardless of 
whether it is viewpoint-based or not.43  Thus, if the Court can argue that a 
regulation is unconstitutional because it is content-based, without determining 
	
 38 See, e.g., Morgan v. Swanson, 755 F.3d 757, 761 (5th Cir. 2014) (contending the assertion that 
“viewpoint discrimination regarding private speech is unconstitutional” is generally true, but that 
the “nearly universal prohibition against viewpoint discrimination does not inform an official as to 
what, precisely, constitutes viewpoint discrimination”). 
 39 See Cásarez, supra note 6, at 505 (“To understand and apply the prohibition against viewpoint 
discrimination, the Supreme Court has had to address two linked and overlapping 
questions. . . . [W]hat qualifies as a ‘viewpoint,’ and . . . what constitutes ‘discrimination.’  
Although these questions appear simplistic, the Court has provided differing answers in various 
contexts, resulting in uncertainty about the meaning of viewpoint discrimination across the board.”) 
 40 See supra notes 32–36 and accompanying text. 
 41 McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2529, 2548–49 (2014) (striking down a statute criminalizing 
standing on public sidewalks within thirty-five feet of abortion clinics in a First Amendment 
challenge because it was not narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest). 
 42 Wood v. Moss, 134 S. Ct. 2056, 2066, 2070 (2014) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted) 
(reversing a Ninth Circuit determination of clearly established viewpoint discrimination by Secret 
Service agents controlling protests where the President was dining). 
 43 See, e.g., McCullen, 134 S. Ct. at 2542 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“[T]he Court found it unnecessary to 
‘parse the differences between . . . two [available] standards’ where a statute challenged on First 
Amendment grounds ‘fail[s] even under the [less demanding] test.’” (alterations in original) (quoting 
McCutcheon v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1446 (2014) (plurality opinion))); 
Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Fla., 848 F.3d 1293, 1307 (11th Cir. 2017) (“Even if the restrictions 
on speech can be seen as viewpoint neutral—a point we need not address—that does not mean that 
they are content-neutral.”). 
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whether it discriminates by viewpoint, the Court will almost always avoid any 
discussion of viewpoint discrimination.  This creates challenges for lower courts 
who struggle to decipher whether a regulation is viewpoint-discriminatory, or 
just impermissibly content-based, under current doctrine. 
An illustration of this unconstitutional, content-based, but viewpoint-
neutral trichotomy, and the tension within each layer, may be found in 
McCullen v. Coakley.44  In McCullen, every member of the Court believed a state 
statute that established a buffer zone on public sidewalks at abortion clinics 
was unconstitutional, but for different reasons.45  Justice Roberts, writing the 
majority opinion joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and 
Kagan, argued that the statute was content-neutral because it did not make 
facially content-based distinctions, but that it did not survive a lesser, albeit 
heightened scrutiny.46  In contrast, Justice Scalia concurred, writing for 
Justices Kennedy and Thomas, and argued the statute was both content- and 
viewpoint-based, such that strict scrutiny was triggered (which the regulation 
could not survive).47  While Justice Scalia did not end the analysis at his 
determination there was viewpoint discrimination—going on to say strict 
scrutiny applied—the Court has never upheld a viewpoint-based regulation 
of protected speech in a traditional public forum. 
The Justices on the Court do not always agree that strict scrutiny should 
apply to content-based regulations in public forums, however.  In Reed, while 
the Court unanimously invalidated a content-based, viewpoint-neutral town 
ordinance, the Justices diverged on the uniform application of strict scrutiny 
for content-based regulations.  In her concurrence, joined by Justices Breyer 
and Ginsburg, Justice Kagan argued that strict scrutiny should not apply to 
all content-based regulations like the one at issue.48  In her view, strict 
scrutiny should apply only where there is a real danger that “official 
suppression of ideas is afoot.”49  Justice Breyer, writing a separate 
concurrence, similarly argued that content discrimination should not always 
trigger strict scrutiny; otherwise, the judiciary will be interfering with and 
managing ordinary government activity because nearly all government 
activity involves speech.50  Effectively, Breyer pushed for strict scrutiny to 
apply to content-based regulations in traditional public forums or that 
discriminate by viewpoint, but not for all cases of content discrimination.  He 
argued that content discrimination should not always be a “determinative 
	
 44 134 S. Ct. at 2534, 2547, 2549. 
 45 Id.  
 46 Id. at 2532. 
 47 Id. at 2547 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“[S]o long as the statute permits speech favorable to abortion 
rights while excluding antiabortion speech, it discriminates on the basis of viewpoint.”). 
 48 Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2238 (2015) (Kagan, J., concurring). 
 49 Id. at 2237 (Kagan, J., concurring). 
 50 Id. at 2234–35 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
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legal tool[ ] in an appropriate case,” instead acting as a “supplement to a 
more basic analysis” of a regulation.51  Thus, even though it may seem settled 
that content-based regulations in traditional or designated public forums are 
subject to strict scrutiny, an undercurrent of alternative reasoning at work 
could perhaps alter this normative principle. 
Two forums where strict scrutiny does not apply per se to content-based 
regulations are limited public forums and nonpublic forums.52  A traditional 
public forum is designated as such primarily because its principal purpose is 
the exchange of ideas.53  Conversely, speech restrictions in a limited public or 
nonpublic forum are subject to fewer First Amendment constraints.54  In either 
forum, a content-based regulation must still be both reasonable and viewpoint-
neutral.55  But that viewpoint neutrality is required for restricting speech in a 
forum subject to lesser scrutiny, calls into question whether viewpoint-based 
regulations on protected speech could ever survive a forum analysis.56  The 
Court has provided little direction as to whether a viewpoint-based, but 
reasonable regulation in a nonpublic forum would be invalidated because it is 
not viewpoint-neutral, or because it does not then survive strict scrutiny. 
	
 51 Id. 
 52 While the Court refers to these differently, they seem to be interchangeable and require the same 
analysis. 
 53 See McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2529 (2014) (finding traditional public forums are 
“venues for the exchange of ideas”). 
 54 See Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 683 (1998) (upholding a public 
broadcaster’s right to exclude a politically nonviable candidate from a televised debate); see also 
Frederick Schauer, Comment, Principles, Institutions, and the First Amendment, 112 HARV. L. REV. 84, 
88–89 (1998) (stating that even though the Court in Forbes found the debate to be a nonpublic 
forum, the majority made the argument that public broadcasting was normally authorized to make 
viewpoint-based decisions because it was not a forum, subject to certain exceptions like debates). 
 55 Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 806 (1985). 
 56 The Supreme Court has not made clear whether failing on the viewpoint-neutral prong of a limited 
public forum analysis would trigger strict scrutiny or invalidate the regulation.  See, e.g., Good News 
Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 106–07 (2001) (noting that a speech restriction in a limited 
public forum “must not discriminate against speech on the basis of viewpoint” (emphasis added)).  
The majority of the circuit opinions read as if viewpoint neutrality is a necessary element to any 
restriction in a limited public forum, not just a potential trigger for more heightened scrutiny.  See, 
e.g., Heaney v. Roberts, 846 F.3d 795, 801 (5th Cir. 2017) (“It is beyond debate that the law 
prohibits viewpoint discrimination in a limited public forum.”); NAACP v. City of Philadelphia, 
834 F.3d 435, 449 n.7 (3d Cir. 2016) (“Apart from reasonableness, a second requirement that exists 
no matter how we label the forum is viewpoint neutrality.”); Hodge v. Talkin, 799 F.3d 1145, 1170 
(D.C. Cir. 2015) (“A law that discriminated on the basis of viewpoint [to shield criticism] would 
plainly infringe the First Amendment even in a nonpublic forum.”); Seattle Mideast Awareness 
Campaign v. King Cty., 781 F.3d 489, 502 (9th Cir. 2015) (“In a limited public forum, . . . what’s 
forbidden is viewpoint discrimination, not content discrimination.”). 
Further, finding a regulation within a limited public forum is unreasonable (the other 
requirement) would deem the statute unconstitutional, rather than trigger any other form of scrutiny.  
See NAACP, 834 F.3d at 442 (“[O]ur conclusion that the ban . . . is unreasonable means that it is 
unconstitutional no matter what we label the forum.  In other words, reasonableness is a bare minimum 
in forum cases.  Some types of forums require more than reasonableness, but none allow less.”). 
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II. VIEWPOINT DISCRIMINATION AT THE SUPREME COURT 
In Perry Education Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, the Court permitted 
(in a 5-4 decision) an incumbent teachers’ union to negotiate a collective 
bargaining agreement with the school board, and to receive access to 
teachers’ mailboxes, while denying access to a rival union.57  Vehemently, 
Justice Brennan and three others dissented, finding the exclusive access 
provision to constitute viewpoint discrimination in violation of the First 
Amendment.58  In the decades since, the Court has developed a multifaceted 
stance on the permissibility of viewpoint-based regulations.  Generally, the 
federal judiciary heavily presumes that viewpoint discrimination is 
unconstitutional when it restricts speech that would otherwise be 
permissible.59  However, the level of scrutiny, or test applied by the Court, 
matters greatly to the broader determination of whether viewpoint neutrality 
is absolutely mandated by the Constitution or not (spoiler: it’s not). 
Based on judicial practice, it is “all but dispositive” to conclude that a law 
regulating speech is content-based and viewpoint-discriminatory because it 
implies that the state favors one viewpoint over another.60  This presumption 
applies to all forums, since viewpoint neutrality is a requirement even in a 
nonpublic forum.  Conservative Justices are apt to declare that any finding 
of viewpoint discrimination is per se invalid for private speech, but such a 
rule has not been accepted by a majority of the Court. 
A.  Impermissible Viewpoint Discrimination 
If a regulation restricts private speech in a public forum, viewpoint 
discrimination is presumptively invalid.  In Good News Club v. Milford Central School, 
for example, the Court held that a school’s denial of a religiously-affiliated club 
to hold afterschool meetings in their facilities constituted impermissible 
viewpoint discrimination.61  Without technically undergoing a strict scrutiny 
analysis but following two precedential cases,62 Justice Thomas found that the 
	
 57 Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 48–49 (1983). 
 58 Id. at 56 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 59 See Rosenberger v. Rector of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829–30 (1995) (“[W]e have observed a 
distinction between . . . content discrimination, which may be permissible if it preserves the 
purposes of that limited forum, and, . . . viewpoint discrimination, which is presumed impermissible 
when directed against speech otherwise within the forum’s limitations.”). 
 60 Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 571 (2011) (citing R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 
377, 382 (1992)); see also Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 828 (declaring an “axiomatic” principle that 
government regulations may not show favoritism based on the speaker or the substantive content 
of the speech). 
 61 Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 108–09 (2001). 
 62 Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 831; Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 
393–94 (1993). 
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viewpoint discrimination at issue was unconstitutional because the club was 
excluded from participation solely based on its religious association.63 
Viewpoint-based regulations on speech that is not fully protected can also 
be scrutinized fatally.  In Sorrell, the Court struck down a statute which barred 
the sale and use of pharmacy records revealing individual doctors’ 
prescribing practices, to be used for pharmaceutical marketing, because it 
imposed a discriminatory burden on certain speakers based on the content 
of the speech.64  Since persons other than pharmaceutical manufacturers 
could obtain the information, the restriction was viewpoint-based.65  
Although commercial speech was at issue, the Court recognized that even 
under a lesser heightened scrutiny, requiring the state to show the statute 
directly advanced a substantial interest and was drawn to achieve said 
interest, the statute was unconstitutional because of the differential treatment 
applied based on viewpoint.66  Lower courts have followed suit here, 
recognizing that “merely wrapping a law in the cloak of ‘commercial speech’ 
does not immunize it from the highest form of scrutiny due government 
attempts to discriminate on the basis of viewpoint.”67 
Even viewpoint-based regulations that target expression deemed 
“worthless” to public debate under the First Amendment are constitutionally 
suspect.68  The question presented in R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, in terms of 
viewpoint discrimination, was whether an ordinance designed to criminalize 
bias-motivated hate speech could criminalize some unprotected speech in a 
category (fighting words based on race) and not all fighting words.69  The 
plaintiffs had burned a cross on the yard of a black family, and were 
prosecuted under this statute.70  The Court found the law facially 
	
 63 See Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 108, 110–12.  Three Justices—Souter, Ginsburg, and Stevens—did 
not think there was viewpoint discrimination at issue.  Id. at 131 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 135–
37 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 64 Sorrell, 564 U.S. at 563–64. 
 65 Id. at 565. 
 66 Id. at 571–72, 580. 
 67 Dana’s R.R. Supply v. Attorney General, Fla., 807 F.3d 1235, 1248 (11th Cir. 2015).  Some 
professional speech proves to be more contentious because of the issues raised in the profession, and 
courts differ as to how to regulate it.  Contra King v. Governor of N.J., 767 F.3d 216, 237 (3d Cir. 
2014) (upholding a state statute that prohibited counselors from rendering their services of sexual 
orientation change efforts to minors because it prevented them from “expressing [their] viewpoint in 
a very specific way”).  Compare NIFLA v. Harris, 839 F.3d 823, 844 (9th Cir. 2016) (holding that a 
state law requiring abortion clinics to disseminate notices stating the existence of publicly-funded 
family-planning services did not violate the First Amendment), with Stuart v. Camnitz, 774 F.3d 238, 
252 (4th Cir. 2014) (holding that a state law requiring doctors to display sonograms and describe 
fetuses to women seeking abortions constituted unconstitutionally compelled speech). 
 68 R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 384–85 (1992). 
 69 Id. at 380–88; see also Kagan, supra note 8, at 417–18 (arguing that the ordinance in R.A.V. was 
struck down because its ban on fighting words that only racists would use failed to protect the 
“interest of listeners in a balanced debate on public issues”). 
 70 R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 379–80. 
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unconstitutional and both content- and viewpoint-based.71  Specifically, 
Scalia noted that the government could not lawfully regulate fighting words 
“based on hostility—or favoritism—towards the underlying message 
expressed.”72  Because the ordinance only prohibited fighting words based 
on “race, color, creed, religion or gender,” it unconstitutionally selected 
certain views expressed through fighting words to be restricted, according to 
the R.A.V. majority.73 
This decision was met with significant opposition, both from scholars and 
other Justices, who felt that the ordinance was unconstitutionally overbroad 
but that the speech was not entitled to any sort of First Amendment 
protection.74  Regulating wholly unprotected speech may still be permissible 
even if viewpoint-discriminatory, as discussed in Subpart II.B.2.  This 
illustration is intended to reflect that it is a rare occurrence that the Justices 
will agree on viewpoint neutrality and the level of scrutiny applied to content-
based restrictions. 
B.  Permissible Viewpoint Discrimination 
Despite the heavy presumption against viewpoint discrimination, the 
Supreme Court has never made a per se rule on its (un)constitutionality.  Few 
circumstances warrant the Court to stray from the viewpoint neutrality 
mandate, but they do exist.  One such category is when the government itself 
speaks, free to select the views it wants to express.75  Such a categorization may 
virtually strip the speech of nearly all First Amendment protection.  The settings 
where the Court has upheld viewpoint-based regulations are discussed presently. 
	
 71 Id. at 391–92. 
 72 Id. at 386. 
 73 Id. at 393–94. 
 74 See, e.g., id. at 400 (White, J., concurring) (“This categorical approach [to proscribable expression 
on the basis of content] has provided a principled and narrowly focused means for distinguishing 
between expression that the government may regulate freely and that which it may regulate on the 
basis of content only upon a showing of compelling need.”).  White concurred in the judgment to 
invalidate the ordinance, reasoning that it was unconstitutionally overbroad.  Id. at 397; see also 
Kagan, supra note 8, at 418 n.14.  In her legal scholarship, Kagan also conceded that she personally 
found the R.A.V. ordinance to be viewpoint-discriminatory, but that it ultimately would “not 
dangerously have distorted public debate,” which seems to be a separate, though not mutually 
exclusive, line of analysis.  Kagan, supra note 8, at 419.  Thus, Kagan has made clear that certain 
viewpoint-based restrictions would not run counter to the broader goal of free expression.  Id. 
 75 See Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 467, 472 (2009) (holding that monuments 
represented government speech, even in public parks, and that the Free Speech Clause “does not 
regulate government speech”); see also Mark Strasser, Government Speech and Circumvention of the First 
Amendment, 44 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 37, 59 (2016) (arguing that the Supreme Court’s lack of 
limitations on government free speech “give[s] the government an easy way to avoid First 
Amendment speech limitations”). 
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1.  Schools 
Although the First Amendment applies to public schools, the Court has 
recognized that it is an arena in which viewpoint-based regulations may be 
permissible.76  In Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, the 
Court recognized this principle, but also noted that schools may be justified 
in restricting speech, so long as such censorship is “caused by something 
more than a mere desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that 
always accompany an unpopular viewpoint.”77 
But the Tinker test, permitting speech restrictions if it would substantially 
and materially disrupt the school’s operation, implicitly recognized that 
viewpoint discrimination may be constitutional in schools while selectively 
censoring certain views should not be.  Despite its analytical structure, this 
test did not create as bright a line as it may appear for exactly when viewpoint 
discrimination is afoot in schools. 
A twenty-first century case may demonstrate how federal courts still 
struggle with analyzing questionably viewpoint-based regulations in schools.  
In B.W.A. v. Farmington R-7 School District, the Eighth Circuit found that a 
public school ban on clothing depicting the Confederate flag did not violate 
free speech and did not constitute viewpoint discrimination.78  At the time, 
there were several racially charged incidents at the school, which led to the 
school district’s decision to ban all clothing depicting the Confederate flag.79  
The circuit court panel then went on to analyze the restriction through 
Tinker’s “substantial disruption” test in schools.80  Given the history of racial 
tension at the school, the court felt there was evidence that images of the 
Confederate flag caused a substantial disruption, and such a clothing ban 
was constitutional.81 
At first, the Eighth Circuit seemed to suggest that the ban on clothing 
containing the Confederate flag was permissible viewpoint discrimination so 
long as it comported with Tinker, but then concluded its First Amendment 
analysis as follows: 
Contrary to [the students’] assertion, viewpoint discrimination by school 
officials is not violative of the First Amendment if the Tinker standard 
requiring a reasonable forecast of substantial disruption or material 
interference is met. . . . Based on the evidence in the record, the school’s ban 
	
 76 See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969). 
 77 Id. at 509. 
 78 554 F.3d 734, 740–41 (8th Cir. 2009). 
 79 Id. at 736–37. 
 80 Id. at 741; see also Tinker, 393 U.S. at 505–06 (arguing that a school could not send students home 
for wearing black armbands to protest the Vietnam War because the armbands were pure speech 
and not disruptive conduct).  The Eighth Circuit felt that Tinker’s framework should be applied 
rather than Morse.  See infra notes 84–86 and accompanying text. 
 81 B.W.A., 554 F.3d at 739, 741. 
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on the flag was reasonably related to a substantial disruption, did not amount 
to viewpoint discrimination, and did not violate the First Amendment. 82 
Perhaps the Court meant to say that the ban was not impermissible viewpoint 
discrimination, but instead conflated a constitutional ban with necessarily 
being viewpoint-neutral.  Several other circuits have followed suit, finding 
that a prohibition on the display—on clothing or otherwise—of the 
Confederate flag in schools does not violate the First Amendment.83  Thus, 
it is more likely that the refusal to permit a display of the Confederate flag is 
viewpoint discrimination.  However, this error—clerical or legal—reflects 
the strong hesitation from writing an opinion that specifically finds viewpoint 
discrimination to be permissible. 
In Morse v. Frederick, the Court did not apply Tinker and upheld a sort of 
viewpoint discrimination in the school setting, finding that a suspension of a 
student for carrying a banner emblazoned with the phrase “BONG HiTS 4 
JESUS” to school did not violate his First Amendment rights.84  The 
conservative Justices were in the majority, maintaining that the principal was 
within her rights as a school administrator because she reasonably believed 
the student’s banner promoted illegal drug use.85  Even the dissent, composed 
of Justices Stevens, Souter and Ginsburg, conceded that “it might well be 
appropriate to tolerate some targeted viewpoint discrimination in this unique 
setting”—though arguing it was impermissible in this case.86 
This is not to say that viewpoint discrimination is always permissible in 
schools, nor that there is unanimity over finding a speech regulation is 
viewpoint-based.  For example, in Christian Legal Society v. Martinez, a five-Justice 
majority held that a public law school’s refusal to recognize a religious-based 
student organization because it did not maintain open eligibility membership 
was reasonable and viewpoint-neutral.87  In dissent, the conservative end of 
the Court argued that the policy—even though coined “non-
discriminatory”—amounted to viewpoint discrimination, and that “we have 
never taken the view that a little viewpoint discrimination is acceptable.”88 
	
 82 Id. at 740–41 (emphasis added). 
 83 See, e.g., Hardwick v. Heyward, 711 F.3d 426, 440 (4th Cir. 2013) (banning clothing with a 
Confederate flag in school was constitutional); Defoe v. Spiva, 625 F.3d 324, 335–36 (6th Cir. 2010) 
(finding Confederate flag displays would be a substantial disruption pursuant to Tinker); McAllum 
v. Cash, 585 F.3d 214, 222–24 (5th Cir. 2009) (concluding that a school ban on any display of the 
Confederate flag did not violate free speech rights). 
 84 551 U.S. 393, 397, 408–10 (2007). 
 85 Id. at 397, 409–10. 
 86 Id. at 439–40 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 87 561 U.S. 661, 669 (2010). 
 88 Id. at 717–18 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
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2.  Unprotected Speech 
Despite the holding in R.A.V., several Justices recognize that states should 
be able to regulate speech, even if in a viewpoint-based manner, that is 
wholly unprotected by the First Amendment.  In Justice White’s concurrence 
in R.A.V., joined by Justices Blackmun, O’Connor, and Stevens, he did not 
refute the finding that the regulation was content-based (or even viewpoint-
based), but that the government should be free to regulate this sort of 
expression deemed historically proscribable.89  White reasoned that if the 
state could ban all fighting words, it should be able to ban a subset of them 
“without creating the danger of driving viewpoints from the marketplace.”90 
Even Scalia’s majority opinion in R.A.V. recognized exceptions to the 
principle that viewpoint-based regulations are impermissible.  First, if the 
“basis for the content discrimination consists entirely of the very reason the 
entire class of speech at issue is proscribable, no significant danger of idea or 
viewpoint discrimination exists.”91  Second, if “the subclass happens to be 
associated with particular ‘secondary effects’ of the speech, so that the 
regulation is ‘justified without reference to the content of the . . . speech.’”92  
Third and finally, a statute does not need to be neutral “so long as the nature 
of the content discrimination is such that there is no realistic possibility that 
official suppression of ideas is afoot.”93 
3.  Non-Coercive Government Subsidies and Speech 
The Court has permitted a form of viewpoint discrimination if the 
government is the one doing the talking.  This has been recognized in the 
subsidy context as well as when the state action constitutes “government 
speech” that does not coerce private speakers into espousing a certain view.94  
	
 89 R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 399–400 (1992) (White, J., concurring). 
 90 Id. at 401.  White also argued that the content-based ordinance would survive strict scrutiny even 
if it was applied.  Id. at 403–04. 
 91 Id. at 388.  The Third Circuit also upheld a statute that fit into this category of permissible content-
based regulations identified in R.A.V.  See King v. Governor of N.J., 767 F.3d 216, 237 (3d Cir. 2014) 
(“[T]he reason professional speech receives diminished protection under the First Amendment—i.e., 
because of the State’s longstanding authority to protect its citizens from ineffective or harmful 
professional practices—is precisely the reason New Jersey targeted [sexual orientation change efforts] 
counseling . . . .”); see also Doe v. Governor of N.J., 783 F.3d 150, 151 (3d Cir. 2015) (following King 
that the same statute did not violate a minor’s right to receive information). 
 92 R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 389 (emphasis omitted) (quoting City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 
U.S. 41, 48 (1986)).  The Fifth Circuit, quoting the categorical exceptions outlined by Scalia in 
R.A.V., upheld a state statute prohibiting so-called “animal crush videos” because the statute 
“regulates a content-defined subclass based on its secondary effects and is justified without reference 
to the content of the speech.”  United States v. Richards, 755 F.3d 269, 277 (5th Cir. 2014). 
 93 R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 390. 
 94 See, e.g., Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2239, 2245–46 (2015) 
(holding that the government’s decision to refuse to approve a license plate design featuring the 
Confederate flag was not unconditional because the license plates constituted government speech 
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For example, in National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, the Court upheld the 
NEA’s “decency and respect” standard for awarding public funding, 
reasoning that such criteria did not “silence speakers by expressly 
‘threaten[ing] censorship of ideas.’”95  While never does the Court say that 
yes, this is viewpoint discrimination and yes, this is permissible, it finds 
constitutional the government’s decision to “merely [choose] to fund one 
activity to the exclusion of the other.”96  Scalia, in a concurring opinion, 
states emphatically that the NEA standard by its terms establishes viewpoint-
based criteria, which is “perfectly” constitutional: “None of this has anything 
to do with abridging anyone’s speech. . . . [T]he difference between me and 
the Court is that I regard the distinction between ‘abridging’ speech and 
funding it as a fundamental divide, on this side of which the First 
Amendment is inapplicable.”97 
Like subsidies, government speech may permissibly prefer certain views 
to the exclusion of others.  This may include government speech that 
contains elements of private speech.  While discussed in greater detail in 
Subpart III.A, Walker v. Sons of Confederate Veterans demonstrates this notion, 
where the Court upheld a decision by the Texas Department of Motor 
Vehicles Board to reject a specialty license plate bearing the Confederate flag 
because it was government speech.98  The Fifth Circuit had reversed the 
district court’s ruling for the board and argued that the plate designs were 
private speech; thus the board’s refusal to approve their design was 
“constitutionally forbidden viewpoint discrimination.”99  The majority of the 
Court found otherwise, determining that the plates did not constitute any 
sort of forum, and was rather government speech because the message 
conveyed suggested it was done so on behalf of the state.100  And when the 
government speaks as a general matter, Justice Breyer wrote, “[I]t is not 
barred by the Free Speech Clause from determining the content of what it 
	
and the government is not constrained by the First Amendment in what it chooses to say unless it 
seeks to “compel private persons to convey the government’s speech”); Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 
173, 194 (1991) (holding that the government did not violate the plaintiffs’ First Amendment rights 
in prohibiting Title X funding for family planning programs to be used in programs that promote 
abortion, stating that the government does not unconstitutionally discriminate “on the basis of 
viewpoint when it chooses to fund a program dedicated to advance certain permissible goals, 
because the program in advancing those goals necessarily discourages alternative goals”). 
 95 524 U.S. 569, 582–83 (1998) (alteration in original) (quoting R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 393). 
 96 Id. at 588 (quoting Rust, 500 U.S. at 193) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 97 Id. at 590, 598–99 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 98 135 S. Ct. 2239, 2253 (2015). 
 99 Id. at 2245. 
 100 Id. at 2246, 2248, 2250.  The majority reached this conclusion by analyzing the factors laid out in 
Summum for determining whether the specialty license plates constitute government speech: history 
of how the speech is communicated, whether they are “closely identified in the public mind with 
the [State],” and the control exercised by the government.  Id. at 2246–48, 2250 (alteration in 
original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 
460, 472 (2009)). 
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says” or to take a position, so long as it does not attempt to compel private 
individuals to express such speech.101  Further, Breyer recognized: 
Our determination that Texas’s specialty license plate designs are 
government speech does not mean that the designs do not also implicate the 
free speech rights of private persons.  We have acknowledged that drivers 
who display a State’s selected license plate designs convey the messages 
communicated through those designs.  And we have recognized that the 
First Amendment stringently limits a State’s authority to compel a private 
party to express a view with which the private party disagrees.  But here, 
compelled private speech is not at issue.  And just as Texas cannot require 
SCV to convey ‘the State’s ideological message,’ SCV cannot force Texas to 
include a Confederate battle flag on its specialty license plates.102 
Breyer’s distinction here rests upon the right of Texas to refuse to be 
associated with a message containing the Confederate flag.  While necessarily 
exercising discretion to refuse the design because of the view it expressed, this 
form of government speech, according to the majority’s interpretation, 
simply cannot be held to a viewpoint-neutral forum analysis. 
4.  Other Plausible Exceptions to the Viewpoint Neutrality Principle 
While the Court has not established another discrete area in which 
viewpoint discrimination may be permissible, there are certain possibilities 
where a viewpoint-based regulation could conceivably survive constitutional 
challenge.  There may be interests compelling enough to survive such an 
analysis.  First, a valid Establishment Clause claim could plausibly be one 
such example, but the Court has not addressed this possibility.103  Second, a 
more amorphous balancing with national security concerns, where the state 
interests are so high as to outweigh First Amendment rights, is conceivably 
an area where the Court would permit viewpoint discrimination.104  This has 
not been supported by the case law, but it is important to acknowledge the 
possibility of views being restricted in the name of national security.  A third 
area is viewpoint-based regulations of commercial speech.  The Court has 
yet to clearly articulate whether a viewpoint-based regulation on commercial 
	
 101 Id. at 2245–46. 
 102 Id. at 2252–53 (citations omitted). 
 103 See Little Pencil, LLC v. Lubbock Indep. Sch. Dist., No. 5:14-CV-014-C, 2014 WL 11531267, at 
*10 (N.D. Tex. May 29, 2014) (finding that restricting a for-profit entity from advancing its religious 
message on school property differs from facility-use and flyer-distribution cases in which the 
Supreme Court found restrictions on religious messages to be impermissible, though the question 
was left unsettled by the Supreme Court as to whether an alleged “Establishment Clause violation 
can justify viewpoint discrimination” (quoting Child Evangelism Fellowship of N.J. Inc. v. Stafford 
Twp. Sch. Dist., 386 F.3d 514, 530 (3d Cir. 2004))). 
 104 See, e.g., Def. Distributed v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 838 F.3d 451, 458 (5th Cir. 2016) (“Ordinarily, of 
course, the protection of constitutional rights would be the highest public interest at issue in a case.  
That is not necessarily true here, however, because the State Department has asserted a very strong 
public interest in national defense and national security.”). 
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speech may be subject to strict (or higher) scrutiny, or may fall within the 
“relaxed scrutiny” of Central Hudson.105  Sorrell left open the possibility—to the 
detriment of First Amendment litigants in lower courts—that a viewpoint-
based regulation of commercial speech may be constitutional so long as it 
survives Central Hudson,106 even if it would not survive strict scrutiny. 
It seems that direct recognition of viewpoint discrimination in any forum 
against protected speech—perhaps save commercial speech—will trigger an 
extreme form of strict scrutiny that is commonly fatal in fact.  Arguably, there 
is no such thing as permissible viewpoint discrimination of protected speech 
in a forum.107  In considering how lower courts are interpreting this 
ambiguity, and consequently shaping the doctrine for litigants, Subpart III 
focuses on two key areas of concern: 1) taking the regulation outside of the 
forum analysis; and 2) expanding (or deferring to) government discretion in 
limited public and nonpublic forums. 
III.  VIEWPOINT DISCRIMINATION AT THE COURTS OF APPEALS 
Because of the trepidation to employ the term “viewpoint discrimination” 
in any favorable opinion to the government, federal courts are hesitant to find 
any viewpoint-based regulation constitutional.  But that is not to say it never 
happens.  Further, a survey of federal appellate decisions since 2014 begs the 
question if determinations of viewpoint neutrality are properly conducted for 
seemingly constitutional, content-based speech regulations.  Table 1 highlights 
the relevant cases decided by the federal courts of appeals since 2014 that 
addressed questions of viewpoint discrimination.  This search recovered over 
200 cases, which were then scrubbed to review only First Amendment 
claims—since many equal protection and other discrimination claims were 
included in the results.  The “Other” column includes cases that were decided 
on the merits but where the regulation was not content-based at all, as well as 
cases without final judgments: this includes, but is not limited to, reversals of 
dismissals, remanding for reconsideration of the viewpoint discrimination 
	
 105 Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1763 (2017).  Compare id. at 1764 (noting that “[the Court] need not 
resolve this debate” whether a trademark constitutes commercial speech because the viewpoint-
based provision at issue in the Lanham Act failed Central Hudson scrutiny regardless), with id. at 1769 
(Thomas, J., concurring) (“I continue to believe that when the government seeks to restrict truthful 
speech in order to suppress the ideas it conveys, strict scrutiny is appropriate, whether or not the 
speech in question may be characterized as ‘commercial.’” (internal quotation marks omitted) 
(citation omitted)), and id. at 1767 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“To the extent trademarks qualify as 
commercial speech, they are an example of why that term or category does not serve as a blanket 
exemption from the First Amendment’s requirement of viewpoint neutrality.”).  More attention is 
given to the opinions in Matal later in this Comment.  See infra Subpart IV.B. 
 106 See supra notes 64–66. 
 107 See, e.g., Russell v. Lundergan-Grimes, 784 F.3d 1037, 1050 n.1 (6th Cir. 2015) (“Viewpoint-based 
restrictions on citizens engaging in such [political] speech on public or private land would be per se 
invalid.”). 
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claim, or upholding or denying a qualified immunity defense.  Table 1 also 
does not account for any cases that were overturned by the Supreme Court. 
TABLE 1 
DECISIONS BY FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEALS 
 INVOLVING VIEWPOINT DISCRIMINATION, 2014–2017108 
Circuit Upheld State Action Invalidated State Action 
 Viewpoint- 
based 
Content-
based but 
Viewpoint 
Neutral 
Other Viewpoint- 
based 
Content-
based but 
Viewpoint 
Neutral 
Other 
11th 1109 3  1 2 1 
10th     2  
9th  8 1   3 
8th  4  1 1  
7th  1   1 1 
6th  1 2 1 2 2 
5th 2110 2 3 1 1 1 
4th 1111   1   
3rd  2 2  1  
2nd  2     
1st  1     
D.C.  1 2   2 
Federal  1  2   
Total 4 26 10 7 10 10 
 
Based on the cases, it is exceedingly rare that a federal court will uphold 
a regulation that is deemed to be viewpoint-based—which is in line with 
Supreme Court precedent.  Courts most often uphold state action against a 
First Amendment challenge by determining it is content-based but 
viewpoint-neutral.  This frequently occurs in nonpublic or limited public 
forums.  Thus, it is important to review in more detail how courts come to 
such conclusions by taking a few example cases, analyzed in Subpart III.B.  
	
 108 This search was conducted by gathering all cases heard from 2014 to 2017 in Westlaw with the 
following search key: “viewpoint discriminat!” OR (viewpoint /s discriminat!).  
 109 See Mech v. School Bd. of Palm Beach Cty., 806 F.3d 1070 (11th Cir. 2015) (upholding as 
viewpoint-based state action that constituted government speech). 
 110 See Machete Prods. v. Page, 809 F.3d 281 (5th Cir. 2015) (rejecting First Amendment challenge to 
selective government funding to incentivize productions of films in Texas); United States v. 
Richards, 755 F.3d 269 (5th Cir. 2014) (upholding animal crushing statute because it only covered 
unprotected form of obscenity). 
 111 See ACLU of N.C. v. Tennyson, 815 F.3d 183 (4th Cir. 2016) (upholding specialty license plate 
program as government speech). 
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Viewpoint-neutral determinations, without a thorough analysis or 
consideration for how they could be applied, may create more opportunities 
for government discretion, and viewpoint discrimination to occur in practice.  
In addition to questions regarding viewpoint neutrality findings, the impact 
of Walker’s holding may give rise to further concerns that viewpoint 
discrimination is permissible if an expression is mixed with government 
speech and not in a forum, as discussed presently. 
A.  Impact of Forum-Shifting 
As discussed in Subpart II.B, there are rare circumstances in which the 
Court has both recognized viewpoint discrimination in a regulation, and still 
upheld it.  Yet, there continues to be disagreement in the federal judiciary 
across the country as to how to evaluate each step: finding that a regulation 
differentiates based on viewpoint (rather than content), and then analyzing 
its constitutionality.  In particular, the federal courts of appeals have seen 
after Walker how taking a First Amendment claim outside of the forum 
analysis effectively releases viewpoint discrimination from consideration.   
A deeper dive into Walker illustrates the impact of what happens when 
First Amendment considerations involving mixed private-government 
speech are taken outside of a forum.  Additionally, consideration for how the 
federal courts of appeals hearing specialty license plate cases decided before 
and after Walker reflect the discord across the judiciary on what is viewpoint 
discrimination and when it may be permissible. 
1.  Walker Whiplash 
As previously noted, the Court in Walker held that the Texas DMV could 
refuse to approve specialty license plate designs because the plates amounted 
to government speech, despite mixed elements of private speech.112  Because 
of such a determination, the majority reasoned that viewpoint discrimination 
was appropriate because there was no forum at issue, and no compulsion of 
private speakers to espouse a particular view. 
Four Justices felt quite differently, vehemently declaring the majority’s 
understanding of the expression as government speech to be “a large and 
painful bite [taken] out of the First Amendment.”113  Chief Justice Roberts 
and Justices Scalia and Kennedy joined the dissent written by Justice Alito, 
who argued the specialty license plates should be categorized as private 
speech in a limited public forum.114  Certainly, in considering the factors in 
Summum, the dissent found elements of government speech within the plates, 
	
 112 Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc. 135 S. Ct. 2239, 2252–53 (2015). 
 113 Id. at 2255 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 114 Id. at 2262. 
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but they were “essentially commissioned by private entities” and expressed a 
“message chosen by those entities,” which equated them more to private 
speech.115  The design scheme was fairly newly established, in order to obtain 
revenue (each cost more than $8,000), and Alito felt it was a slippery slope to 
consider such speech governmental, freeing it from most First Amendment 
restraints.116  To push his point forward, Alito analogized: 
It is essential that government be able to express its own viewpoint, the Court 
reminds us, because otherwise, how would it promote its programs, like 
recycling and vaccinations?  So when Texas issues a “Rather Be Golfing” 
plate, but not a “Rather Be Playing Tennis” or “Rather Be Bowling” plate, 
it is furthering a state policy to promote golf but not tennis or bowling.  And 
when Texas allows motorists to obtain a Notre Dame license plate but not a 
University of Southern California plate, it is taking sides in that long-time 
rivalry.117 
The dissent felt this form of “pure viewpoint discrimination” clearly violated 
the First Amendment when applied to private speech.118  Although Alito did 
not explicitly contemplate that such a form of viewpoint discrimination is per 
se unconstitutional, he did not conduct a strict scrutiny analysis.119 
As the Justices clashed over each facet of the viewpoint discrimination 
analysis, the circuit courts before and after Walker also struggled with 
evaluating similar claims, and whether license plates constituted a “forum” 
within First Amendment analysis.  Two members of the Fifth Circuit, hearing 
the Walker case before certiorari was granted, had utilized similar reasoning to 
the Walker dissent when they held the refusal of the Confederate flag design 
was unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination of private speech.120  In 
reaching its conclusion, the court noted that they were not alone in reaching 
such a result: “In fact, the majority of the other circuits to consider this question 
have held that the state engaged in viewpoint discrimination when it denied a 
specialty license plate based on the speaker’s message.”121  This support 
assumes, without qualifying in this context, that viewpoint discrimination is 
patently unconstitutional.  The lone dissenter, Judge Jerry Smith, did not 
disagree that it was viewpoint discrimination, but felt the refusal was shielded 
	
 115 Id. at 2260. 
 116 See id. at 2255–56 (“While all license plates unquestionably contain some government 
speech . . . Texas has converted the remaining space on its specialty plates into little mobile 
billboards on which motorists can display their own messages.  And what Texas did here was to 
reject one of the [private] messages . . . because the State thought that many of its citizens would 
find the message offensive.  That is blatant viewpoint discrimination.”). 
 117 Id. at 2255 (citation omitted). 
 118 Id. at 2262. 
 119 See id. at 2263 (“This rationale [that the plate would distract drivers] cannot withstand strict 
scrutiny.”). 
 120 Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc. v. Vandergriff, 759 F.3d 388, 397–98 (5th Cir. 2014).  
Vandergriff was the Chairman of the Texas Board of the Department of Motor Vehicles at the 
time. 
 121 Id. at 400. 
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by the government speech doctrine—as the Walker majority ultimately 
concluded.122  Further, he found the comparison to other circuits unpersuasive, 
as they were all decided before Summum, except for one.123 
In between the Fifth Circuit’s initial decision and the Walker opinion, the 
Second Circuit heard its own specialty license plate design dispute in Children 
First Foundation, Inc. v. Fiala.124  In an opinion later vacated and remanded, 
then dismissed by the plaintiff after Walker, the majority of the Second Circuit 
panel found that the program was private speech in a nonpublic forum, and 
not government speech outside the forum context.125  Similar to the Walker 
dissent, the court applied the Summum factors and had “little difficulty” 
concluding it was private speech, but that the plates were still government 
property, creating a nonpublic forum.126  However, it argued the denial of a 
“Choose Life” license plate was done in a viewpoint-neutral manner because 
the program’s policy was to completely exclude “controversial political and 
social issues—regardless of the viewpoint espoused.”127  Judge Livingston 
dissented, finding that the program led to unbridled discretion for the State, 
“thereby inviting viewpoint discrimination.”128  Thus, the Second Circuit 
upheld the program, similar to the Supreme Court in Walker, but for 
completely different reasons.  They disagreed on the category of the 
speech—private versus government—and disagreed about whether 
viewpoint discrimination was at play. 
Given that the Walker majority effectively removed this form of speech 
outside the protection of the First Amendment129 by declaring it government 
speech, other circuits followed suit.  Indeed, the fears articulated in the Walker 
dissent, coupled with concerns expressed by both opinions in Children First 
Foundation, may have been realized in the discretion afforded to North 
Carolina’s specialty license plate program by the Fourth Circuit.  In ACLU of 
North Carolina v. Tata, the Fourth Circuit had ruled in favor of a plaintiff who 
argued that North Carolina’s refusal to grant their pro-choice plate design 
	
 122 Id. at 401 (Smith, J., dissenting). 
 123 Id. at 403–04. 
 124 Children First Found., Inc. v. Fiala, 790 F.3d 328, 334 (2d Cir. 2015), vacated, 611 F. App’x 741 (2d 
Cir. 2015). 
 125 Id.  Interestingly, the Second Circuit felt that the Supreme Court “has not yet articulated a test to 
distinguish government speech from private speech,” even though this was decided after Summum.  
Id. at 338.  It appears the Court was waiting for Walker to confirm that was the proper analysis. 
 126 Id. at 338, 340–42. 
 127 Id. at 346. 
 128 Id. at 353–54 (Livingston, J., dissenting). 
 129 Technically, this speech is still protected by the First Amendment because government speech 
cannot compel private speakers to espouse a certain view, but other protections seen in forum 
analysis or other forms of private speech are removed.  See Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate 
Veterans, Inc. 135 S. Ct. 2239, 2246 (2015) (“That is not to say that a government’s ability to 
express itself is without restriction. . . . [T]he Free Speech Clause itself may constrain the 
government’s speech if, for example, the government seeks to compel private persons to convey the 
government’s speech.”). 
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while approving a pro-life design violated the First Amendment.130  The state’s 
petition for writ of certiorari was granted, and the Supreme Court vacated and 
remanded following its decision in Walker.131  After applying the Court’s 
reasoning there, the Fourth Circuit then reversed its earlier decision and held 
that the specialty license plate program was government speech; therefore the 
state had the right to refuse (or accept) designs conveying certain messages.132 
As is the trend with viewpoint-based claims, not everyone hearing the case 
agreed, with Judge Wynn attempting to distinguish the circumstances in 
North Carolina from those in Walker.  In dissent, he argued that the Walker 
holding should be understood narrowly, and that the speech expressed in 
specialty license plates is not “pure government speech,” which would impact 
the scrutiny applied and keep it in some sort of forum.133  Further, Wynn 
reasoned that the plate “presents mixed speech—with private speech 
components that prohibit viewpoint discrimination. . . . [by] allowing a 
‘Choose Life’ specialty plate while repeatedly rejecting a ‘Respect Choice’ 
plate, North Carolina violated the First Amendment.”134  A critical distinction 
from Walker was North Carolina’s acceptance of one view—“Choose Life”—
and the rejection of the opposing view—“Respect Choice.”  Such state action 
involving mixed speech was, to Judge Wynn, “viewpoint discrimination in 
violation of the First Amendment.”135  But this argument failed to convince a 
majority in the Fourth Circuit to strike down the program.  Perhaps then, 
Walker’s reasoning could threaten other mixed but seemingly private 
messages, such as those at schools,136 or even public advertising. 
After Walker, by declaring an expression to constitute government speech, 
no further analysis beyond compulsion is required to comport with the First 
Amendment.  Indeed, every Supreme Court Justice (seemingly), the Fifth 
and Fourth Circuits, and Judge Livingston on the Second Circuit agreed that 
refusing a license plate design was in fact viewpoint discrimination.  As Justice 
Alito flatly stated: “Whatever it means to motorists who display that symbol 
	
 130 742 F.3d 563, 566 (4th Cir. 2014). 
 131 Berger v. ACLU of N.C., 135 S. Ct. 2886, 2886 (2015). 
 132 ACLU of N.C. v. Tennyson, 815 F.3d 183, 185 (4th Cir. 2016). 
 133 Id. at 185–86 (Wynn, J., dissenting). 
 134 Id. at 186.  This selective decision-making of refusal and acceptance seemed to be under 
consideration in Fiala in the Second Circuit.  See Children First Found., Inc. v. Fiala, 790 F.3d 328, 
346 (2d Cir. 2015) (“It is not our place to evaluate and weigh the various hot button issues of our 
time against one another, assigning to each a specific place in the landscape of public debate in this 
country.”). 
 135 Tennyson, 815 F.3d at 187 (Wynn, J. dissenting). 
 136 See Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2239, 2256 (2015) (Alito, 
J., dissenting). (“What if a state college or university did the same thing with a similar billboard or 
a campus bulletin board or dorm list serve?  What if it allowed private messages that are consistent 
with prevailing views on campus but banned those that disturbed some students or faculty?  Can 
there be any doubt that these examples of viewpoint discrimination would violate the First 
Amendment?  I hope not, but the future uses of today’s precedent remain to be seen.”). 
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and to those who see it, the [Confederate] flag expresses a viewpoint.”137  
Permissible viewpoint discrimination may be extended to apply to more 
mixed-speech if the Court finds no analysis is necessary so long as 
government speech is at issue and there is no compulsion of private speech. 
2.  Foreshadowing Forum Shifts Elsewhere 
The worry with the Walker Court’s decision to cabin a viewpoint-based 
regulation from heightened scrutiny so long as it constitutes government 
speech, is largely that it is unclear how far this principle can be applied to 
mixed private-government speech.138  Ironically, in Mech v. School Board of 
Palm Beach County, the Eleventh Circuit quoted Alito’s dissent when it found 
government speech was at issue, noting: “Because characterizing speech as 
government speech ‘strips it of all First Amendment protection’ under the 
Free Speech Clause, we do not do so lightly.”139  In Mech, a school board’s 
decision to remove tutoring business signs from its school fences was held to 
be constitutional because it was government speech.140  Unlike in the 
specialty license plate line of cases discussed previously, the signs were not 
controversial on their face, advertising for “The Happy/Fun Math Tutor” 
organization.141  However, the tutor was a retired pornographic film star, 
performing in hundreds of films and who still owned a production company 
that formerly produced pornographic material.142  Finding that the 
advertising banners were technically endorsed by the school under the terms 
of school policy, the Court sided with the State that this was government 
speech, and therefore the schools were free to remove signs with which they 
disagreed.143  While the Court never flatly stated that the ban was viewpoint 
discrimination, it argued that for government speech, the state is free to select 
the views it wants to express.144  Thus, determining that the banners were 
government speech was wholly dispositive of the First Amendment claim at 
issue, and no further viewpoint discrimination analysis was required. 
Airports may be another area of mixed private speech and state 
regulation that could cause headaches to courts trying to decipher the 
viewpoint neutrality mandate.  In NAACP v. City of Philadelphia, the Third 
Circuit found the city’s ban on noncommercial content in airport advertising 
	
 137 Id. at 2262. 
 138 See Mech v. Sch. Bd. of Palm Beach Cty., 806 F.3d 1070, 1074 (11th Cir. 2015) (“The Supreme 
Court has not articulated a precise test for separating government speech from private 
speech . . . .”). 
 139 Id. (citation omitted). 
 140 Id. at 1075. 
 141 Id. at 1072–73. 
 142 Id. at 1072. 
 143 Id. at 1075. 
 144 Id. at 1074. 
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space to be unreasonable within the limited public forum context, and 
therefore unconstitutional.145  In its brief before the appeal was litigated, the 
NAACP argued that the Third Circuit could rule in its favor just because the 
statute was not viewpoint-neutral:  “On its face, the Policy allows the City to 
display ads expressing the City’s views on any and all topics, even on 
potentially controversial social issues—and the City has in fact displayed such 
ads—while prohibiting organizations with contrary views from displaying 
their own ads.”146  However, because it could rule on unreasonableness, the 
court forewent any viewpoint discrimination analysis because it was 
unnecessary, while still acknowledging the intent behind the statute might 
have been viewpoint-discriminatory.147 
In dissent, Judge Hardiman felt that the ban was a reasonable attempt to 
“avoid controversy” at the airport—a vague rationale that seemed to cut 
against the free flow of ideas.148  Hardiman also, seemingly begrudgingly, 
attempted to follow Walker and applied it to the State’s ability to regulate its 
airport advertising space.  Specifically, he wrote: 
In addition, with the power to express noncommercial positions and 
exclude those to the contrary, the City could create an environment in which 
passersby are led to believe that the City’s positions are 
uncontested. . . . This illusion of consensus, which uniquely threatens the 
marketplace of ideas, is similar to the concern Justice Alito warned of in his 
dissent in Walker.  In response to that concern, the Court has instructed that 
when the government speaks, “it is not barred by the Free Speech Clause 
from determining the content of what it says” . . . . Based on that directive, 
I must conclude that the Policy does not implicate viewpoint discrimination 
concerns that would plainly exist if private speech were at issue.149 
The City utilized a similar line of argument in its reply brief, where it argued 
that permitting government speech and not private speech should not 
constitute viewpoint discrimination after Walker and Reed.  Specifically, “in 
the Airport advertising space forum—where we rigorously prohibit private 
noncommercial speech—we have no obligation to allow Plaintiff to speak, 
even if we have the opportunity to speak ourselves.”150  Ultimately, perhaps 
to avoid controversial consideration of viewpoint neutrality, the Third 
Circuit avoided these arguments, and only Hardiman supported the 
reasoning expressed in the City’s brief that Walker should apply to this sort of 
regulation in such a forum. 
	
 145 834 F.3d 435, 448–49 (3d Cir. 2016). 
 146 Brief for Appellee at 23, NAACP v. City of Philadelphia, 834 F.3d 435 (3d Cir. 2016) (No. 15-
1002). 
 147 NAACP, 834 F.3d at 449 n.7. 
 148 Id. at 449 (Hardiman, J., dissenting). 
 149 Id. at 457. 
 150 Reply Brief for Appellant at 16, NAACP v. City of Philadelphia, 834 F.3d 435 (3d Cir. 2016) (No. 
15-1002). 
752 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 20:3 
While this was a single dissenting judge positing that Walker could be 
extended in this manner, it reflects ambiguity over the extent of the 
government speech rationale, and the absence of an articulated approach to 
managing viewpoint discrimination concerns.  At minimum, it suggests that 
a more precise standard for analyzing viewpoint-based regulations involving 
mixed government speech should be provided. 
B.  Government Discretion in Limited Public or Nonpublic Forums 
While Walker’s government speech directive may not have spread to other 
forums such as airports yet, judges continue to disagree about what constitutes 
viewpoint discrimination, the type of speech, or the forum at issue.  Even if a 
speech regulation applies to a nonpublic or limited, designated, or traditional 
public forum, the impact of subjectivity and discretion may permit otherwise-
impermissible viewpoint discrimination to trickle into state action.  Indeed, 
even facially viewpoint-neutral statutes “do not eliminate the danger of 
censorship presented by a facially content-based statute, as future government 
officials may one day wield such statutes to suppress disfavored speech.”151 
Public agencies exercise extensive discretion, for example, in approving 
advertising in public spaces, like airports or buses.  Not all circuits analyze 
speech regulations over public advertising in the same manner, or treat them 
as the same forum.  For example, the Ninth Circuit analyzes regulations of 
local bus advertising as a nonpublic forum while others view them as 
designated public forums.152  In Seattle Mideast Awareness Campaign v. King County 
(“SeaMAC”) the Ninth Circuit found that the county bus advertising system was 
a constitutionally content-based, but viewpoint-neutral means of regulating 
speech in the forum.153  Metro had approved an ad by SeaMAC, a non-profit 
organization opposed to U.S. support for Israel, that displayed messages such 
as “Israel’s War Crimes: Your Tax Dollars at Work.”154  After extensive media 
coverage (but before the ads ran), pro-Israel groups submitted bus ads to Metro 
that displayed messages such as “Support Israel, Defeat Islamic Jihad.”155  The 
county withdrew approval of the SeaMAC ad and rejected the pro-Israel ads, 
then revised its policy to exclude any political or ideological advertising.156  The 
	
 151 Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2229 (2015). 
 152 See Seattle Mideast Awareness Campaign v. King Cty., 781 F.3d 489, 498–99 (9th Cir. 2015) (“We 
recognize that other courts have held that similar transit advertising programs constitute designated 
public forums.  Some of those courts, in our view, mistakenly concluded that if the government 
opens a forum and is willing to accept political speech, it has necessarily signaled an intent to create 
a designated public forum.”).  Dissenting in SeaMAC, Judge Christen argued that the bus was a 
designated public forum, and should be remanded for a proper strict scrutiny analysis.  Id. at 503 
(Christen, J., dissenting). 
 153 Id. at 501–03. 
 154 Id. at 494–95. 
 155 Id. 
 156 Id. at 495. 
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Ninth Circuit seemed satisfied that the regulation was constitutional where 
county discretion was applied in a viewpoint-neutral manner.157 
The First Circuit, faced with a similar legal question about its bus 
advertising program and ads regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, came 
to an analogous conclusion as the Ninth Circuit did in SeaMAC—that this was 
a nonpublic forum and that the discretionary policy was exercised without 
discriminating by viewpoint.158  In American Freedom Defense Initiative v. 
Massachusetts Bay Transport Authority (“MBTA”), the MBTA had approved an 
ad depicting different maps of Israel and Palestine that demonstrated alleged 
Palestinian loss of land.159  A pro-Israeli group submitted several ads in 
response, and its third version was rejected because the juxtaposition of the 
“civilized man” and “the savage” above a “Support Israel” caption contained 
demeaning information that disparaged individuals or groups according to 
the MBTA board.160  The majority of the First Circuit found that the MBTA’s 
consideration of linguistic and grammatical distinctions in the advertisements 
and that it accepted some of the pro-Israel ads, reflected that the policy was 
viewpoint-neutral.161  Thus, the subjective conclusions by the MBTA of what 
is “disparaging” and what is not were not found to be viewpoint-based. 
Like in SeaMAC, there was a dissenter in MBTA, but unlike the dissenting 
judge in SeaMAC, Judge Stahl felt that the transit authority’s rejection of a 
pro-Israel ad was “neither viewpoint neutral nor reasonable.”162  He pointed 
out that the pro-Palestine ad containing maps depicted a message that 
arguably demeaned and disparaged Israelis as people who caused a refugee 
crisis, violating the regulatory scheme, and that riders only had access to one 
viewpoint on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.163  Judge Stahl distinguished 
from SeaMAC, noting that the transit system policy there rejected all pending 
ads related to the political conflict, while “the MBTA’s incongruous decision 
to post the Committee for Peace ad, but reject AFDI’s submissions, at the 
very least, raises the specter of viewpoint discrimination by the MBTA.”164   
Even though the MBTA was following protocol of language and 
grammar in its decisions, the power of discretion in selecting whether speech 
will be published can leave the door open for viewpoint discrimination.  A 
case recently decided in federal district court in Washington, D.C., also 
	
 157 Id. at 501–03. 
 158 Am. Freedom Def. Initiative v. Mass. Bay Transp. Auth., 781 F.3d 571, 581–84 (1st Cir. 2015). 
 159 Id. at 574–75. 
 160 Id. at 576–77; accord Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 258–59 (1952) (upholding a state statute 
that criminalized the exhibit of any play or sketch portraying a class of citizens in a significantly 
negative light, reasoning that the state should have power to punish libel “directed at a defined 
group”). 
 161 781 F.3d at 584–87. 
 162 Id. at 593 (Stahl, J., dissenting). 
 163 Id. at 594. 
 164 Id. at 595. 
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brought by the American Freedom Defense Initiative,165 suggests how forum 
analysis and “viewpoint neutral” use of discretion could continue to disguise 
plausibly viewpoint-discriminatory actions in limited or nonpublic forums.  
IV.  MATAL V. TAM 
The Court had an opportunity to provide the federal judiciary and the 
Bar with a more precise viewpoint neutrality mandate in its decision in Matal 
v. Tam.166  Simon Tam, an Asian-American musician, claimed his First 
Amendment rights were violated through viewpoint discrimination after the 
Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”) refused to register a trademark of his 
band’s name, “The Slants.”167  Specifically, the PTO reasoned that the name, 
a derogatory term for individuals of Asian descent, may “disparage . . . or 
bring . . . into contemp[t] or disrepute” persons of Asian descent, violating the 
disparagement clause of the Lanham Act.168  The PTO normally employs a 
two-part test to evaluate whether a trademark would be disparaging: first, 
consideration of the meaning of the trademark in question, and whether it 
refers to “identifiable persons, institutions, beliefs or national symbols,”169 and 
second, whether such a meaning would be “disparaging to a substantial 
composite of the referenced group.”170  Applying this test, the PTO rejected 
Tam’s trademark request because “a substantial composite of persons . . . find 
the term in the applied-for mark offensive.”171  Tam appealed the denial to 
the PTO’s Trademark Trial and Appeal Board, where the panel affirmed the 
PTO’s original decision.172  Then, Tam filed suit in federal court. 
A. Tam at the Federal Circuit 
The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that the government 
unconstitutionally denied a trademark registration because the trademark 
violated the disparagement provision of the Lanham Act.173  The en banc 
majority found such a provision to amount to viewpoint discrimination of 
private speech—not government speech.  To decide otherwise, they 
reasoned, “would transform every act of government registration into one of 
	
 165 See Am. Freedom Def. Initiative v. WMATA, 245 F. Supp. 3d 205, 211–13 (D.D.C. 2017) (finding 
public bus advertising space to constitute a nonpublic forum, and its decision to close the space to 
issue-oriented ads—even though it had “published issue-oriented ads in the past”—was viewpoint 
neutral).  The decision was not appealed to the D.C. Circuit. 
 166 137 S. Ct. 1744 (2017). 
 167 Id. at 1751. 
 168 Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a) (2012)). 
 169 Id. at 1753 (quoting TMEP § 1203.03(b)(i) (8th ed. Apr. 2017)). 
 170 Id. at 1754 (quoting TMEP § 1203.03(b)(i) (8th ed. Apr. 2017)). 
 171 Id. (citation omitted). 
 172 Id. 
 173 In re Tam, 808 F.3d 1321, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2016). 
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government speech and thus allow rampant viewpoint discrimination.  When 
the government registers a trademark, it regulates private speech.  It does not 
speak for itself.”174  Because this was viewpoint discrimination, the court 
determined that strict scrutiny applied, but had no need to go through the 
analysis because the Government did not argue that the disparagement 
provision of the Act would satisfy strict scrutiny.175 
The Tam circuit judges proffered widely different opinions, however, on 
the level of scrutiny, whether viewpoint discrimination was at issue, and 
whether, even if it did exist, it was that sort of viewpoint discrimination that 
was permissible.  Judge Dyk, dissenting in part, argued that the trademark 
registration process was a subsidy, where viewpoint neutrality is not necessary, 
or at the very least that the Supreme Court has not declared it as such.176  
Assuming arguendo it was, Dyk reasoned that the Act’s disparagement 
provision was viewpoint-neutral because it looks “only to the views of the 
referenced group” when determining whether it is disparaging.177  Judge 
Lourie, dissenting, felt that the First Amendment should not be implicated at 
all.178  Even if it were, the registration program and disparagement provision 
were not viewpoint-discriminatory, similar to Dyk’s rationale.179 
Finally, Judge Reyna, dissenting, argued that the regulation survived 
intermediate scrutiny under a commercial speech analysis.180  Additionally, 
he went so far as to suggest that the law is content-neutral because “an 
apparently content-based law is nevertheless considered content-neutral if 
the government’s purpose is not to suppress speech, but to address the 
harmful secondary effects of that speech.”181  Reyna relied on the secondary 
	
 174 Id. at 1348.  In the state university trademark context, the Eighth Circuit similarly found that denying 
a trademark request with evidence of viewpoint-discriminatory motive was an impermissible 
restriction on private speech, but in a limited public forum.  See Gerlich v. Leath, 861 F.3d 697, 707 
(8th Cir. 2017) (holding that university officials denying plaintiff’s request for a design with a cannabis 
leaf was impermissible viewpoint discrimination).  In Gerlich, the State did not even bring forth an 
argument that the trademark program was narrowly tailored, suggesting that the Bar also struggles 
with understanding the force and contours of viewpoint neutrality requirements.  Id. at 705–07. 
 175 In re Tam, 808 F.3d at 1328, 1355–56.  But see id. at 1364 (Dyk, J., concurring in part and dissenting 
in part) (“Ultimately, unlike the majority, I do not think that the government must support, or 
society tolerate, disparaging trademarks in the name of commercial speech.”). 
 176 Id. at 1368 (Dyk, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 177 Id. at 1371.  He also argued that viewpoint discrimination only applies to whether the government 
disagrees with the view, not other individuals or groups.  Id. at 1372.  But see Bell v. City of Winter 
Park, 745 F.3d 1318, 1324–25 (11th Cir. 2014) (invalidating an ordinance that allowed a person 
residing in a dwelling unit to post “no loitering” signs, enforceable by city officers, because the 
private citizens had discretion to enforce in a viewpoint-discriminatory manner). 
 178 In re Tam, 808 F.3d at 1374 (Lourie, J., dissenting). 
 179 See id. at 1375–76 (“The government action does not include a judgment on the worthiness or the 
effectiveness of the mark; if it did, it might—but not necessarily—venture into viewpoint-
discrimination territory.”). 
 180 Id. at 1376 (Reyna, J., dissenting) (“[T]he refusal to register disparaging marks under § 2(a) of the 
Lanham Act is an appropriate regulation that directly advances the government’s substantial 
interest in the orderly flow of commerce.”). 
 181 Id. at 1378 (citation omitted).  Judge Reyna’s syntactical attempt to categorize the seemingly 
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effects doctrine to support this argument, and then turned to a sort of burden-
balancing test to justify the suppression (“of particularly low-value speech”) 
at issue in the commercial context.182 
In re Tam exemplifies the judicial discord in evaluating First Amendment 
claims implicating questions of viewpoint discrimination.  Federal judges at 
the highest levels frequently disagree on what it really means to discriminate 
based on ideology and viewpoint, whether the motive behind an action 
requires the intent to suppress ideas, and when, if ever, such discrimination 
may be appropriate.  Given that the Federal Circuit left all of these questions 
in contention—type of speech at issue, level of scrutiny, motives behind the 
regulation, state interest—it was critical for the Supreme Court to provide 
answers when it granted certiorari.183 
B. Tam at the Supreme Court 
As much as a clear, articulable rule or standard for evaluating viewpoint-
based regulations is desired, Matal v. Tam proved once again how critical 
viewpoint neutrality may be, but how challenging it is to fix its boundaries 
within our constitutional constellation.  During oral arguments for Tam, 
Justice Kagan flatly stated that the disparagement clause of the Lanham Act 
was a “fairly classic case of viewpoint discrimination”184—but clarity on that 
conclusion, as well as sound reasoning to be replicated was needed in the 
Court’s opinion.  Why was the rejection of Tam’s trademark so classically 
viewpoint discrimination? 
A majority of the Justices agreed that the PTO’s decision was indeed 
viewpoint discrimination, but the consensus stopped there: Justice Alito 
announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the opinion of the Court 
with respect to certain parts of his opinion, with only Chief Justice Roberts 
and Justices Thomas and Breyer joining him for the entire opinion.185  Alito 
began by noting that the PTO’s action offended a “bedrock” principle of the 
First Amendment: “Speech may not be banned on the ground that it 
expresses ideas that offend.”186  After briefly outlining the history of 
trademarks and their protection at common law before such federal laws 
	
content-based regulation as “content-neutral,” rather than argue that the content-based regulation 
survives strict scrutiny, cuts at the core of the confusion in forum-shifting and speech-shifting.  
 182 Id. at 1379–81. 
 183 Lee v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 30 (2016). 
 184 Transcript of Oral Argument at 12–13, Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744 (2017) (No. 15-1293). 
 185 Tam, 137 S. Ct. at 1751.  Justice Gorsuch took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.  
All of the Justices who took part in the decision joined Part I, discussing facts and procedural history, 
and Part III-A, holding that federally registered trademarks were private, not government speech.  
All but Justice Thomas joined Part II of the opinion, rejecting Tam’s argument that Asians as a 
group were not “persons” within the meaning of the Lanham Act.  Then Chief Justice Roberts and 
Justices Thomas and Breyer joined Justice Alito in Parts III-B, III-V, and IV. 
 186 Id. 
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were enacted, Alito emphasized that regardless of their commercial history, 
trademarks extend “beyond phrases that do no more than identify a good or 
service,” and frequently include “phrases that convey a message.”187 
The Court unanimously agreed that federally registered trademarks are 
private speech, rather than government speech.188  And given the Justices’ 
unanimity here, it is fair to presume the Court has no intention of extending 
Walker and other government speech precedent.  Indeed, the Court directly 
distinguished registered trademarks from the specialty license plates at issue 
in Walker as well as the public park monuments at issue in Summum.189  Further, 
while Alito acknowledged the importance of the government speech doctrine 
in order for the government to function by expressing certain views, he also 
emphasized how it was a doctrine “susceptible to dangerous misuse.”190  
Applying similar reasoning from his dissenting opinion in Walker, Alito wrote: 
The Federal Government does not dream up these marks, and it does not 
edit marks submitted for registration. . . .  
In light of all this, it is far-fetched to suggest that the content of a registered 
mark is government speech.  If the federal registration of a trademark makes 
the mark government speech, the Federal Government is babbling 
prodigiously and incoherently.  It is saying many unseemly things.  It is 
expressing contradictory views.  It is unashamedly endorsing a vast array of 
commercial products and services.  And it is providing Delphic advice to the 
consuming public.191 
Thus, the Court made clear that federally registered trademarks were not an 
area where viewpoint discrimination could be shielded by the government 
speech doctrine. 
Next, Alito rejected the Government’s argument that this was a case 
involving government subsidies or government programs, an area where 
viewpoint discrimination may be permissible.192  This conclusion, however, 
was only joined by three other Justices.  This part of the opinion also argued 
(in dicta) that if this were a scenario in which the Government created a limited 
public forum for private speech, viewpoint discrimination would still be 
	
 187 Id. at 1752. 
 188 Id. at 1760. 
 189 Id. at 1757–60; cf. supra notes 75, 100–102 and accompanying text (discussing government speech 
doctrine in Walker, 135 S. Ct. at 2253, and Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 464 
(2009)).  All eight participating Justices joined in this section of the opinion—Parts III-A. 
 190 Tam, 137 S. Ct. at 1758. 
 191 Id. (citations omitted). 
 192 Id. at 1760–61; see also supra Subpart II.B (discussing permissibility of viewpoint discrimination in 
cases of government subsidies, including Rust and Finley).  Alito distinguished precedents such as 
Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 177–78 (1991), and Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569 
(1998), primarily because they “all involved cash subsidies or their equivalent,” which was not at 
issue in Tam.  Tam, 137 S. Ct. at 1761. 
	
758 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 20:3 
“forbidden.”193  And for three Justices joining Part III-B of Alito’s opinion, the 
disparagement clause of the Lanham Act was clearly viewpoint discrimination: 
Our cases use the term “viewpoint” discrimination in a broad sense, and 
in that sense, the disparagement clause discriminates on the bases of 
“viewpoint.”  To be sure, the clause evenhandedly prohibits disparagement 
of all groups.  It applies equally to marks that damn Democrats and 
Republicans, capitalists and socialists, and those arrayed on both sides of 
every possible issue.  It denies registration to any mark that is offensive to a 
substantial percentage of the members of any group.  But in the sense relevant 
here, that is viewpoint discrimination: Giving offense is a viewpoint.194 
Once viewpoint discrimination was evidenced, Alito looked next to what 
level of scrutiny could apply to see if there would ever be a circumstance in 
which the Lanham Act’s viewpoint-based disparagement clause could be 
constitutionally viable.  But instead of proffering a clear answer, Alito 
concluded that the disparagement clause failed even intermediate scrutiny 
applied to commercial speech under Central Hudson.195  Thus, to these four 
Justices, the disparagement clause was not narrowly drawn to serve a 
substantial government interest.  An interest in promoting racial tolerance 
was insufficient, running counter to the First Amendment’s protection of the 
freedom to express “thought that we hate”—to quote Justice Holmes.196  And 
the clause was not narrowly drawn to promote the government’s other 
asserted interest—protecting the orderly flow of commerce by “driv[ing] out 
trademarks that support invidious discrimination.”197  Alito’s opinion did not 
provide a roadmap for lower courts to (i) clearly identify what viewpoint 
discrimination is, and (ii) when and how to determine whether such 
viewpoint discrimination is constitutionally permissible.  Given a lack of any 
language regarding viewpoint discrimination of private speech as per se 
unconstitutional, courts may still infer that there are some undefined 
scenarios in which it is permissible. 
Justice Kennedy, in a concurring opinion joined by Justices Ginsburg, 
Sotomayor and Kagan, wavered more on whether viewpoint-based 
regulations—such as the one at issue in Tam—could ever be constitutional.  
Kennedy agreed with Justice Alito that the disparagement clause of the 
Lanham Act constituted viewpoint discrimination, but argued that such a 
determination “renders unnecessary any extended treatment of other 
questions raised.”198  He first noted that viewpoint-based regulations are 
	
 193 Tam, 137 S. Ct. at 1763. 
 194 Id. 
 195 Id. at 1763–64 (citing Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 
557, 573 (1980) (Blackmun, J., concurring)). 
 196 Id. at 1764 (quoting United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644, 655 (1929) (Holmes, J., dissenting)). 
 197 Id. at 1765. 
 198 Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
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“presumptively unconstitutional,”199 and that the disparagement clause 
exemplified viewpoint discrimination because the PTO may deny a 
trademark that offends a person, institution, or national symbol, but not a 
trademark that praises.  Such a regulation “might silence dissent and distort 
the marketplace of ideas.”200  Kennedy did not explicitly argue that viewpoint 
discrimination was per se unconstitutional—just that it invokes some form of 
heightened scrutiny.  Only a few lines later, however, Kennedy wrote, “It is 
telling that the Court’s precedents have recognized just one narrow situation 
in which viewpoint discrimination is permissible: where the government itself 
is speaking or recruiting others to communicate a message on its behalf.”201  
By concluding that the disparagement clause is not government speech, for 
Kennedy, that is enough to strike down the regulation. 
Justice Thomas joined Justice Alito’s opinion in all parts except Part II—
analyzing and ultimately rejecting Tam’s statutory argument that Asians 
were not “persons” within the meaning of the Lanham Act.  Thomas chose 
to emphasize in his two-paragraph-opinion that viewpoint-based regulations 
should be subject to strict scrutiny, regardless of whether the speech 
constitutes commercial or noncommercial speech.202 
C.  Contextualizing Tam 
It is too early to say how the lower courts will interpret Tam, although 
some decisions suggest it will narrow the circumstances by which a regulation 
that squawks like viewpoint discrimination will be upheld.203  But there are 
several points worth noting here.  First, Alito’s Walker dissent effectively 
triumphs in his Tam majority opinion, and very likely limited the expansion 
of Walker into recognizing more mixed private-public speech as free from the 
strictures of viewpoint neutrality.  Second, the Court has yet to articulate 
exactly what level of scrutiny should be applied to viewpoint-based 
	
 199 Id. at 1766 (citing Rosenberger v. Rector of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 830 (1995)). 
 200 Id. 
 201 Id. at 1768. 
 202 Id. at 1769 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 203 See, e.g., Freedom from Religion Found. Inc. v. Abbott, No. A-16-CA-00233-SS, 2017 WL 4582804, 
at *5–7 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 13, 2017), appeal filed, No. 17-50956 (5th Cir. Oct. 27, 2017) (finding the 
decision to take down plaintiff’s exhibit in a limited public forum either “for its satiric tone or for its 
nontheistic point of view . . . constitutes impermissible viewpoint discrimination” and an 
unconstitutional motive under Matal); Davison v. Loudoun Cty. Bd. of Supervisors, No. 1:16-CV-
00932-JCC-IDD, 2017 WL 3158389, at *11–12 (E.D. Va. July 25, 2017), appeal filed sub nom., Davison 
v. Randall, No. 17-2002 (4th Cir. Aug. 29, 2017) (banning plaintiff from participating in defendant 
public official’s social media page because plaintiff’s views were unconstitutional viewpoint 
discrimination, even if the ban only lasted a few hours); cf. March v. Mills, 867 F.3d 46, 65–66 (1st 
Cir. 2017) (invoking Matal to acknowledge that “when a restriction on speech is underinclusive, there 
may be reason to doubt ‘whether the government is in fact pursuing the interest it invokes, rather 
than disfavoring a particular speaker or viewpoint,’” though finding the statute at issue had no 
underinclusivity problem). 
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regulations on commercial speech, since Justice Alito’s majority opinion simply 
found the provision could not even withstand Central Hudson.204  
Third, by Justice Kennedy’s reasoning, viewpoint-based regulations 
might always be considered unconstitutional except in situations where the 
government speaks for itself.  Indeed, he concludes his Matal concurrence by 
saying: 
A law that can be directed against speech found offensive to some portion 
of the public [is] . . . to the detriment of all.  The First Amendment does not 
entrust that power to the government’s benevolence.  Instead, our reliance 
must be on the substantial safeguards of free and open discussion in a 
democratic society.205   
This generalization seems to buck other accepted forms of viewpoint 
discrimination outside of the government speech context, and avoids a clear 
analysis of when viewpoint discrimination is permissible in those circumstances.  
Finally, as the composition of the Supreme Court bench may shift in the coming 
years—for example Justice Gorsuch’s past First Amendment jurisprudence 
seems to align closely with Justice Scalia206—a more concrete structure towards 
approaching viewpoint-based regulations of protected speech outside of the 
government speech doctrine is possible, and needed. 
Discord across the federal judiciary when facing viewpoint discrimination 
claims suggest that the Court should expound further upon the general 
inquiry of when a speech restriction constitutes viewpoint discrimination.  
Further, every circumstance for which viewpoint discrimination is permissible 
have yet to be discovered.  A more effective, executable analysis of i) what is 
viewpoint discrimination and ii) when (if ever) the Constitution permits it will 
help guide federal courts through a questionably viewpoint-discriminatory, 
but perhaps permissible regulation of speech.  It also would help litigants who 
do not put forth arguments for different levels of scrutiny or speech 
characterizations.207  The Court could provide this through adjusting levels of 
scrutiny for which Kagan’s Reed concurrence advocated; requiring a 
	
 204 See supra note 105 and accompanying text. 
 205 Tam, 137 S. Ct. at 1769 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 206 Tejinder Singh, Judge Gorsuch’s First Amendment Jurisprudence, SCOTUSBLOG (Mar. 7, 2017, 11:16 
AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2017/03/judge-gorsuchs-first-amendment-jurisprudence/. 
 207 See, e.g., Gerlich v. Leath, 861 F.3d 697, 704–07 (8th Cir. 2017) (denying plaintiff’s request for a 
design with a cannabis leaf was impermissible viewpoint discrimination); supra note 174 and 
accompanying text. 
It should also be noted that because the law is not clearly established—or at least it does not 
appear to be clearly established—immunity defenses of state actors are significantly more likely to be 
sustained against viewpoint discrimination challenges.  See, e.g., Morgan v. Swanson, 755 F.3d 757, 
761–62 (5th Cir. 2014) (finding a school principal had qualified immunity for prohibiting students 
from distributing written religious materials at school because it was not clear she was violating clearly 
established law).  But see Heaney v. Roberts, 846 F.3d 795, 802–03 (5th Cir. 2017) (denying a qualified 
immunity defense because there was a dispute as to whether a councilman, who removed a citizen 
from a parish council meeting, acted with improper motive—thereby amounting to viewpoint 
discrimination; viewpoint neutrality was considered a clearly established First Amendment right). 
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discriminatory motive analysis, as seen by several circuits;208 declaring that 
viewpoint-based restrictions are per se invalid in any forum except for when 
the government speaks, suggested by Tam; or another test yet to be seen. 
CONCLUSION 
While viewpoint discrimination is still highly disapproved, it is not 
absolutely barred by the First Amendment.  Indeed, the Court has permitted 
viewpoint discrimination in several contexts, including schools, subsidies, 
government speech, and left open the possibility it may be permissible in 
other areas.  It would be impossible to eradicate viewpoint discrimination 
completely from state action, nor is that a goal espoused by any member of 
the Court.  However, clarity is needed to protect free speech and to monitor 
potential suppression of ideas, both on the face of a statute targeting mixed 
speech and also through discriminatory application of a viewpoint-neutral 
statute.  Only then will it be clear where viewpoint neutrality should be 
concretely situated in First Amendment doctrine. 
	
 208 Some judges and circuit courts advocate for an intent or motive requirement for all viewpoint 
discrimination claims.  See, e.g., Gerlich, 861 F.3d at 705 (“Every viewpoint discrimination claim 
‘requires, by its very nature, that the purposes or motives of governmental officials be determined.’” 
(quoting Gay & Lesbian Student Ass’n v. Gohn, 850 F.2d 361, 367 (1988))); NAACP v. City of 
Philadelphia, 834 F.3d 435, 449 n.7 (3rd Cir. 2016) (“Though some courts appear to say that motive 
is not enough and that there must be evidence that the restriction is being implemented in a 
discriminatory way . . . we have never so held.  As such, we note that this remains an open question 
in our Court.”); Seattle Mideast Awareness Campaign v. King Cty., 781 F.3d 489, 502 (9th Cir. 
2015) (“Prevailing on this as-applied [viewpoint-discrimination] claim requires evidence that the 
government intended to ‘suppress expression merely because public officials oppose the speaker’s 
view.’” (quoting Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983)); Pahls v. 
Thomas, 718 F.3d 1210, 1230–31 (10th Cir. 2013) (comparing established Supreme Court doctrine 
on viewpoint discrimination in the First Amendment context with the Tenth Circuit approach, which 
requires a showing that the “defendant [state] acted with a viewpoint-discriminatory purpose”). 
Plaintiffs argued in Jacobson v. United States Dep’t of Homeland Sec. in the Ninth Circuit that 
viewpoint discrimination occurred under the guise of a viewpoint-neutral application of an 
enforcement zone regulation, not because of the words of the policy itself, but because the state 
action was “plainly motivated by the nature of [Plaintiffs’] message.”  Plaintiff-Appellants’ Leesa 
Jacobson et al.’s Opening Brief at 36, Jacobson v. U.S. Dept. of Homeland Sec., 882 F.3d 878 (9th 
Cir. 2018) (No. 16-17199) (internal quotation marks omitted).  The Ninth Circuit vacated and 
remanded back to the district court to determine whether “the enforcement zone is a public forum, 
and whether the government’s exclusion policy is permissible under the principles of forum 
analysis.” 882 F.3d 878, 884 (9th Cir. 2018).  It will be interesting to see how the court rules in this 
case, as the Ninth Circuit currently has decided in the government’s favor for content-based, 
viewpoint-neutral regulations, more than any other circuit.  See supra tbl.1. 
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